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Abstract 
 
 
We study the dynamic bidirectional relationship between firm R&D intensity and corporate 
diversification, using longitudinal data of Spanish manufacturing companies. Our empirical approach 
takes into account the censored nature of the dependent variables and the existence of firm-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity. Whereas we find a positive linear effect of R&D intensity on related 
diversification, the evidence about the effect of related diversification on R&D intensity takes the form of 
an inverted U. Hence, the effect of related diversification on R&D intensity is positive but marginally 
decreasing for moderate levels of related diversification, but such effect can turn out negative for high 
levels of related diversification. Additionally, the consequences of the dynamic relation are that the 
effects are substantially larger in the long-run than in the short-run. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between R&D intensity and corporate diversification has received considerable attention 
in empirical research on strategic management (e.g. Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Chen, 1996; 
Silverman, 1999). While there is a pervasive evidence of a linear and positive effect of related 
diversification on R&D intensity, the empirical evidence about the effect of R&D intensity on 
diversification is mixed (see Table 1). While most empirical work has concentrated in unidirectional 
relationships, there is a lack of evidence about the potential feedback between diversification and R&D 
intensity. 
 In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on the contradictory findings concerning the link 
between corporate diversification and R&D intensity. We posit a dynamic bidirectional hypothesis 
between corporate diversification and R&D intensity, and evaluate such relationship at the empirical 
level. The dynamic nature of such relationship is sustained by the concepts of synergies and economies of 
scope. This bidirectional link emphasizes the endogenous character of the relationship between corporate 
diversification and technological resources (Baldwin and Scott, 1987; Miller 2004).  
 Most empirical studies of corporate diversification have looked at the experience of U.S.-based 
companies (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). However, the institutional environment in which firms operate 
determines their dominant growth mode. In the US, diversification takes place mainly through external 
growth, but this is not the case in Europe (Mayer and Whittington, 2003), and particularly in Spain. In 
those contributions which consider both organic growth and external growth, the effects of these 
alternative growth modes are not distinguished (see Table 1). Regarding this, it would be worth to isolate 
the effect of organic growth by means of a sample of companies which only make use of this growth 
mode.
1
 
 We evaluate the theoretical hypothesis using information supplied by the Survey of Business 
Strategies, a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing companies, between 1990 and 2001. The 
availability of longitudinal firm-level panel data allows to consider the dynamic features of R&D intensity 
and diversification decisions, allowing for lagged effects distributed over time and thus distinguishing 
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between short-run and long-run effects. For the purpose of characterizing the simultaneous decisions 
regarding R&D intensity and diversification and the potential feedback between them, we estimate a 
bivariate VAR for R&D intensity and related diversification, augmented by additional covariates. In order 
to obtain robust results, we also control for two potential sources of endogeneity: censoring and 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. The failure to account for any of these two sources of endogeneity can 
provide misleading implications. 
 Our empirical results provide evidence in favor of the bidirectional relationship between 
corporate diversification and R&D intensity, in two extents. First, a rise in R&D intensity has a positive 
effect on related diversification. Second, related diversification influences R&D intensity in the form of 
an inverted-U shaped function, what implies that for moderate levels of diversification there is positive 
effect of related diversification on R&D intensity, yet marginally decreasing, so that this effect is lesser 
when the level of diversification is greater (and could be eventually offset when the degree of 
diversification is high enough). The dynamic nature of the relationship implies that short-run and long-run 
effects are different, the latter being significantly greater. This result points out that time is needed for 
generating and exploiting synergies and economies of scope. 
 
2. Theory and Hypothesis 
 Since the last decades, there is a steady interest in the link between diversification strategy and 
R&D intensity, which has been empirically analyzed in several studies, which we have summarized in 
Table 1. However, to our knowledge, empirical studies have adopted a unidirectional approach, which 
provide conflicting evidence. On the one hand, the common finding about the effect of diversification on 
R&D intensity is that such effect is positive. Among the few exceptions, we should mention Hill and 
Hansen (1991) or Schnoenecker and Cooper (1998), referred to very particular industries, and Miller 
(2004), where, in an external growth framework, diversification affects R&D intensity negatively. On the 
other hand, with regard to the effect of R&D intensity on diversification, evidence is odd, finding a 
 4 
positive (Davis and Thomas, 1993; Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992) or negative influence (Hitt et al 1996; 
Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997).  
 In our view, there are several reasons which can be behind these striking differences. First, the 
measures of these two strategic variables, diversification and R&D intensity, differ across studies. In 
particular, many studies do not distinguish between related and unrelated diversification, whose 
consequences can be remarkably different. Second, most studies do not distinguish between growth 
modes, and the decision about growth mode influences on both corporate diversification and R&D 
intensity. Third, assumptions about the time schedule by which the effects take place may affect the 
results. Fourth, there are differences in the methodological approach that can affect conclusions. The 
different approaches that studies shown in Table 1 have undertaken are very likely to affect empirical 
findings. Nonetheless, and more importantly, no study analyzes the bidirectional relationship, which 
acknowledges the potential feedback between these two strategic decisions. We believe that it is 
necessary to go further and propose a new hypothesis posing a dynamic bidirectional relationship between 
both strategic variables. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 There are two kinds of arguments that support the link between related diversification and R&D 
intensity. From the point of view of production, super-additive value synergies among the firm’s 
businesses (Davis and Thomas, 1993) derived from input complementarities, so that the output value of a 
multiproduct firm exceeds the sum of individual outputs. On the other hand, from the point of view of 
costs, economies of scope, because of sub-additive production costs derived from resource sharing 
between businesses (Teece, 1982) imply that joint production costs are lower than the sum of individual 
production costs. Nevertheless, as Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005) point out, the concepts of synergy 
and economies of scope have been used synonymously, because the cost function and the production 
function are alternative views of the firm’s decision problem. While this line of reasoning is concerned 
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with related diversification, no synergies and economies of scope among the technological activities are 
expected in the case of unrelated diversification. 
 In a diversified firm, the generation of synergies and economies of scope from the relationship 
between related corporate diversification and R&D intensity implies two benefits: more options to exploit 
R&D intensity; and a more efficient use of R&D intensity. Related diversification provides the firm 
broader options in which technological resources can be exploited, so that investment in R&D might be 
increased so as to reach wider technological areas. In turn, the larger scope of technological resources 
may lead to further related diversification so as to optimize the exploitation of available technological 
resources. A more efficient use of technological resources implies that the relative amount of 
technological resources may decrease with the number of related businesses because of the appearance of 
economies of scope (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; Miller 2004). Thus, after a certain level of related 
diversification is achieved, lower additional investment in R&D is needed in order to compete in new 
businesses. As a consequence of the combined effect of synergies and economies of scope, as business 
relatedness reaches a certain degree, R&D saving might offset the synergies effect because of economies 
of scope.  
 According to the previous related literature, we can suggest that as R&D investment increases, the 
level of related diversification will increase as well. By the same token, as related diversification rises, 
R&D intensity increases because of the existence of synergies. However, whenever the degree of related 
diversification is high enough, the effect of economies of scope may eventually offset the effect of 
synergies. Therefore, the effect of related diversification on R&D intensity may be nonlinear, 
characterized by an inverted U-shaped function, where the effect of related diversification on R&D 
intensity is positive but marginally decreasing, and might be even negative for high levels of related 
diversification. Such non-linearity may also help to reconcile the empirical evidence of earlier research on 
this topic (Table 1). 
  Still, two additional elements of the relationship between R&D intensity and corporate 
diversification need to be considered: the growth mode and the time schedule in the relationship. There 
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are different modes through which firms can grow, internal or organic, external, and cooperative (Tsang 
2000). As we mentioned earlier, most studies included in Table 1 do not distinguish between external and 
organic growth, and there is no study that analyzes firms experiencing organic growth exclusively. We 
believe that the absence of control for growth mode may lead to unclear conclusions concerning R&D 
intensity and the related diversification link. The choice among these growth modes is related to the 
minimization of the transaction costs associated with these different governance structures (Williamson, 
1975), which, in addition to firm characteristics, depend on the institutional environment in which firms 
are involved. Furthermore, growth modes affect how diversification is extended (Busija et al., 1997; 
Chang and Singh, 1999; Chatterjee and Singh, 1997) and how diversification and R&D intensity are 
related (Miller, 2004)
2
. Then, the choice of companies under study entails non neutral implications about 
the empirical findings. External growth is the dominant growth mode among US companies, in which 
most empirical work have focused. However, external growth (through mergers and acquisitions) entails 
diversification decisions which can be affected by agency problems. Yet this is not usually the case for 
companies located in most European countries, which are dominated by organic growth (Mayer and 
Whittington, 2003). Therefore, the evidence provided by European companies can help to identify the 
effect of organic growth. One of the advantages of concentrating in companies which are primarily 
involved in organic growth is that the diversification strategy can be isolated from other considerations. 
Also, the fact that most firms undertake organic growth makes conclusions based on firms for which this 
growth mode is the dominant, at least qualitatively, general for almost all firms. 
The major concern in this paper is to acknowledge the dynamic nature of the relationship between 
R&D intensity and corporate diversification. These two decisions have a strategic and intertemporal 
nature because their consequences have a lasting influence in the organization and the performance of the 
firm. The intertemporal nature has been acknowledged, among others, by Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004), in 
the context of related diversification decisions. In other words, these decisions have persistent 
implications, so that their relevance exceeds the instantaneous or short-run consequences. The implicit 
framework within which the firm determines the target levels of its strategic variables is a dynamic 
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intertemporal decision model in which the firm takes into account their effect on current and future 
performance. In addition, such decisions are constrained by the fact that variations in these strategic 
variables entail costs to the firm which affect the time length within the firm will adjust to the new target 
levels of such variables. Particularly, if the optimal targets in the strategic variables imply large changes, 
it may be more profitable to distribute such changes along a longer time until reaching the target level, 
instead of making the full change instantaneously, what would entail higher costs to the firm. Learning 
effects and organizational issues (Mayer and Whittington, 2003; Grant and Jammine, 1988; Bergh, 1995) 
are among the primary reasons which can induce such costs. In economics literature, these sorts of costs 
are labeled as “adjustment costs” (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004). Empirically, this is reflected by the fact 
that lagged values of the strategic variables will appear among the covariates of the equations 
characterizing such strategic decision. As a consequence, the short-run or instantaneous effect of a change 
in any covariate will differ from the long-run effect (the total accumulated effect). Thus, we would expect 
that the R&D intensity influence on related diversification (and vice versa) will be more intense in the 
long run than in the short run. These dynamic considerations provide further rationale for the potential 
feedback between R&D intensity and diversification. In addition, the dynamic considerations of the 
relationship have the additional implication that the effect of changes in any covariate can take place with 
a certain delay. Consequently, the initial effect of corporate diversification on R&D intensity (and vice 
versa) may take place with a certain time lag after the other strategic variable has changed. Moreover, this 
effect may be distributed over time, so the duration of the total effect can be long. 
 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1. In a context of organic growth, R&D intensity and related 
diversification show a bidirectional relationship, in which the total effect takes 
several years to be achieved, so that the long-run or total effect is greater than the 
short-run or instantaneous effect. 
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Hypothesis 1a. On the one hand, R&D intensity has a linear and positive influence 
on the level of related diversification. 
Hypothesis 1b. And on the other hand, related diversification influences R&D 
intensity through an inverted-U shaped function. In other words, although the effect 
of related diversification on R&D intensity is initially positive, it is marginally 
decreasing, so that it may turn out negative when the level of related diversification 
is high enough. 
 
3. Econometric Issues 
The dynamic hypothesis that we propose requires us to characterize the simultaneous decisions of 
R&D and diversification in the empirical analysis. Our concern for the importance of dynamic feedback 
has already been expressed in earlier work, in the sense that the lack of accounting for such feedback 
effects (because of the use of cross-sectional data) is behind the failure to establish a clear relationship 
between diversification and R&D. In his review of empirical work, Bergh (1995:1697) claims that change 
over time has not been accounted for empirically. Hill and Hansen (1991:187) state that cross-sectional 
studies are unable to determine the underlying causal relationship.  
In order to allow for the potential feedback between R&D intensity and diversification decisions, 
we posit a dynamic model for the joint decisions of R&D intensity and related diversification, conditional 
on further covariates. The availability of longitudinal data allows us to characterize the potential dynamic 
effects. In particular, our model consists on a bivariate augmented VAR (vector auto-regression) model 
(see Holtz-Eakin et al, 1988) for R&D intensity and related diversification, where each of the two 
equations contains both lagged measures of the two variables.  
Formally, using i to index companies and t to denote time periods, the equation for each of the 
two strategic decisions can be written as follows, 
 
'
1 , 1 2 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 2
, related diversification, R&D intensity ( )
jit j j ji t j ji t j ki t j ki t jit jity y y y y x v
j k j k
α ρ ρ δ δ β
− − − −
= + + + + + +
= ≠
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where jit
v
 is the error term, and jit
x
 is the vector of further covariates. This dynamic structure will have 
two major consequences. First, the interrelation between the two decision variables may follow a 
distributed lag structure and therefore the whole interrelation effect may take some time. Second, the 
effect of a change in any of the right-hand-side variables will differ in the short and in the long run due to 
the presence of lagged values of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of each equation. 
Specifically, the short-run effects can be substantially lower than the long run-effects.  
Among the contributions that exploit panel data to carry out empirical work, we should refer to 
Merino and Rodríguez (1997), Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002), and Miller (2006). The first one studies the 
discrete decision on whether or not to diversify, being particularly concerned with the inconsistency bias 
of the estimates because of disregarding unobserved firm heterogeneity, for which they propose a proper 
econometric treatment that requires panel data. The second one studies the role of agency problems in 
profitability, taking into account dynamic effects. The third one finds a positive relationship between 
technological diversification and performance, using a random effects model. 
The variables that we are considering are strategic, in the sense that managers base their decisions 
on expectations about future firm performance (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003), so that managerial 
decisions are endogenous. There are two potential sources of endogeneity that we wish to consider jointly 
in order to obtain appropriate estimates that guarantee robust results. The first one arises from the fact that 
the dependent variables in each equation (R&D intensity and diversification) are censored. The second 
one is the existence of firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity, which is potentially correlated with the 
right-hand-side variables. In contrast with the random effects approach, which disregards such potential 
correlation, we will consider fixed effects models. For the sake of clarity, we will first describe these two 
problems separately. 
The censoring problem arises from the fact that the decision variables can be positive, but for a 
large proportion of the observations will be exactly equal to zero (very especially in the case of 
diversification). Therefore, the observed decision variables have two components: a qualitative one 
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corresponding to the strictly positive and zero-valued observations, and a continuous one describing the 
range of positive values. The proper treatment of this kind of dependent variables requires to characterize 
the firm’s discrete decision on whether to innovate (respectively, diversify) or not, and the firm’s decision 
on the amount of R&D intensity (resp., diversification). 
Let our model of interest (omitting the indices t and j for the sake of simplicity) be 
 
* 'i i iy x uβ= +  (2) 
where 
*
iy  denotes the variable of interest in the absence of censoring, ix  is a vector of covariates and β  
is its corresponding vector of unknown coefficients which represent the respective effect of the 
covariates. For each observation, the dependent variable can be described as  
 
* *
*
  if 0
0  if 0
i i
i
i
y I
y
I
>
=
≤
{  (3) 
where *
iI  determines the censoring (i.e., whether the firm does innovate/diversify or not), in accordance 
with the auxiliary equation, 
 * 'i i iI z vγ= +  (4) 
In the case of R&D intensity (respectively, diversification) decision, 
*
iI  denotes the marginal net revenue 
of such decision, so that we will observe a firm innovating (resp. diversifying) if the marginal net revenue 
of R&D intensity (resp. diversification) is positive; otherwise, the firm will not innovate (resp., diversify). 
In principle, neither the right-hand-side variables (and thus the censoring mechanism) nor the magnitudes 
of their effects need to coincide in the equation of interest which determine the positive amount of R&D 
(resp., diversification) and in the auxiliary equation describing the marginal net revenue of the qualitative 
decision on whether to innovate (resp. diversify) or not. 
 The parameters of interest can be consistently estimated using the subsample of positive 
observations by means of a two-stage procedure (Heckman, 1978). Formally, the augmented equation for 
the variable of interest for the subsample of positive observations can be written as  
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 $* ' ii i iy x β δ λ ν= + +  (5) 
where $ iλ  is an additional variable which captures the estimated bias for the ith observation due to the 
truncation of the sample. Such bias is based on the estimates of the auxiliary equation about the 
qualitative decision on whether to innovate (resp., diversify) or not. 
 The problem of unobserved heterogeneity arises from the existence of relevant unobserved firm 
characteristics potentially correlated with the existing covariates. Under the assumption that firm-specific 
unobserved characteristics are invariant over time, the availability of longitudinal or panel data may yield 
consistent estimates in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. Using the subscript t to denote time, and 
in the absence of censoring, we can write the model for longitudinal data as  
 
*
  '      ,it it i ity x uβ η= + +  
where iη  is an unobserved random variable which captures time-invariant differences across firms. The 
problem resembles an omitted variable problem. The availability of the panel makes it possible to apply a 
transformation that removes the unobserved heterogeneity term. Particularly, subtracting from the above 
equation the same equation lagged one period (which also includes the unobserved heterogeneity term), 
and denoting ∆ as the difference operator, we find that  
 
*   '    ,it it ity x uβ∆ = ∆ + ∆  
where the unobserved heterogeneity term iη  has been removed, under the assumption of time invariance, 
because of the first-differences transformation, but the parameter vector of interest β  has remained 
unchanged after such transformation. The fact that there are endogenous variables among the covariates 
(the lagged dependent variable, among others), requires an instrumental variable procedure. The obvious 
instruments are the lagged values of the covariates, which are uncorrelated with the error term. We can 
therefore apply a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (see Hansen 1982, Arellano and 
Bond 1991). In particular, our estimation approach consists of a system-GMM estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
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The combination of these two problems, censoring and unobserved heterogeneity, makes things 
even more complicated. Our approach is based on Bover and Arellano (1997), and Arellano, Bover and 
Labeaga (1999). In the first place, we will deal with the censoring problem. For this purpose, we will 
consider, separately for each year, the estimation of auxiliary equations for 
*
ity  in order to obtain 
predictions of 
*
ity  for the censored observations. These auxiliary equations will be estimated by means of 
the aforementioned two-stage procedure. We can construct afterwards an estimate of the variable 
*
ity  in 
the absence of censoring, 
%
*
it
y , by substituting the zeros by their corresponding predictions and estimate 
the model with the full sample as if censoring had not taken place. Although the proper econometric 
treatment of these problems may reduce the precision in the estimates, disregarding these problems would 
lead to inconsistent, and therefore meaningless, estimates, no matter how precise they might be.  
 
3. Data and Variables 
Data 
The data set is an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufacturing firms, recorded in the database 
Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (Survey on Business Strategies, ESEE hereinafter)
3
. This 
database has been used previously by Merino and Rodríguez (1997), among others, in the analysis of 
corporate diversification. It contains annual information for a large number of Spanish companies whose 
main activity was manufacturing between 1990 and 2001.  
Our final sample consists of 513 non-energy manufacturing companies which satisfy the 
following criteria. Firstly, the nature of the company cannot be substantially altered in the sample period, 
so that we discard mergers or splits, as well as changes in the main activity (defined at the two-digit 
industry level). Consequently, and in accordance with the hypothesis that we posit, our sample contains 
those companies which carry out only organic growth strategies, and those companies that undertake 
portfolio restructuring are disregarded. Secondly, we require the companies to operate in at least two 
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markets whose geographical scope must be national or wider. Finally, the companies are required to have 
a minimum of 25 employees
4
. In Table A.1 we show the sample distribution of companies by two-digit 
industry and by size. It is important to notice that the unbalanced feature of the panel implies that the time 
length during which we observe the different companies is unequal, reflecting the fact that such 
companies may enter and exit from the survey (in the same way that companies appear and disappear in 
the economy). Restricting the sample of companies to be observed along the same time period would 
affect the randomness of the sample. Instead, we only require sample companies to have full information 
available on all the relevant variables for at least five consecutive years, between 1990 and 2001, in order 
to obtain sufficient information concerning firm dynamics. 
 
Variables and measures 
 We define R&D intensity as the proportion in firm sales of its R&D expenditure, in line with 
earlier related work, such as Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989), and Hitt et al. (1997), among others. We 
employ the entropy index as diversification measure (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu 1985), which is 
of common use in strategic management literature (see, e.g., Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). This 
measure is thus defined as 
 
1
lni
i i
d P
P
  
= ×  
  
∑
, 
where the subindex i represents the ith product segment. The entropy index is thus a weighted average of 
the sales attributed to each firm’s segment, Pi, the weights being the natural logarithm of the inverse of 
the segment’s sales, ln(1/Pi). The entropy index of total diversification can be broken down as the sum of 
two components: the index of related product diversification, dR, and the index of unrelated product 
diversification, dU. Whereas related product diversification, dR, captures the diversification across four-
digit SIC industries within each two-digit industry (with firm’s sales in the two-digit industry as 
reference), unrelated product diversification, dU, captures diversification across two-digit industries (with 
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total firm sales as reference). For the diversification equation, and given the reasons discussed previously, 
we will concentrate on related product diversification as the dependent variable. 
We consider several control variables. First, we include the natural logarithm of total firm sales in 
order to control for firm size. Regarding R&D intensity, the influence of firm size on R&D intensity is 
still a matter of controversy (King et al., 2003: 591). On the other hand, several studies such as those by 
Bettis (1981), Hill and Snell (1988), or Hoskisson et al (1993), among others, have found a significant 
correlation between firm size and diversification. 
Furthermore, earlier studies have found spillover effects of R&D at the industry level, 
demonstrating that the average level of industry R&D affects the relative firms’ R&D intensity as well as 
their propensity to introduce new products (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). In addition, other factors 
associated with the firm’s environment, defined as the industry in which the firm operates, can affect the 
outcome of our variables of interest. To control for such effects, we include as additional regressors 
dummies representing each firm’s two-digit SIC major industry. Since industry effects can vary over 
time, we also consider time dummies as well as industry dummies interacted with time dummies (see 
Bergh, 1995; McGahan and Porter, 1997, among others). 
In order to consider the potential effect of the maturity of the firm, and therefore the accumulated 
know-how of the firm, on R&D intensity and diversification decisions, we have also included age 
dummies, for which we have chosen the following age groups: less than 10 years, between 10 and 20 
years, between 20 and 40 years, and older than 40 years. We believe that these qualitative dummies are 
preferable to the use of the continuous variable of the age of the firm, due to the unrealibility of such a 
measure for older firms (Alonso-Borrego and Collado, 2002). 
Finally, we have also considered the potential effect of several covariates, whose omission could 
bias the results: first, the firm marketing decision using the percentage of advertising expenditure with 
respect to sales; second, the logarithm of firm sales. We have already evaluated the relevance of some 
other variables, such as whether the firm has industrial establishments abroad (which is the best 
approximation that we have found in our dataset to international diversification), or whether the firm 
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belongs to an enterprise group, as well as the firm market share in its main market (as a measure of its 
market power), and measures of firm liquidity and leverage. However, these latter variables did not 
appear to be statistically relevant in our analysis. Therefore, the results including them have not been 
reported. 
Among the significant correlations reported in Table 2, we should highlight the positive 
correlation of R&D intensity with related diversification. Furthermore, the logarithm of sales is also 
positively correlated with the two decision variables, R&D intensity and related diversification. In 
addition, firm size presents a positive correlation with R&D intensity, but not with related diversification. 
The opposite is true for firm age: we only find a positive correlation with the diversification decision. 
Hence, the preliminary descriptive analysis suggests that it is the maturity of the firm, rather than its size, 
what matters for diversification. The opposite is true for R&D intensity. Nevertheless, the correlation 
analysis disregards the censored nature of the decision variables as well as the interaction between the 
potential explanatory variables. Concerning this latter point, in order to capture the partial effects on the 
decision variable of every explanatory variable keeping constant the others, we must proceed with a 
multivariate regression analysis.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
In the upper part of Table 3, we report the means and standard deviations of the variables of 
interest for the full sample. However, given the censoring of R&D intensity and related diversification, 
we broke down these statistics depending on whether both R&D intensity and related diversification are 
zero or positive. We observe that zero R&D intensity and zero diversification are more likely when the 
firm is smaller and/or younger. However, there does not appear to be any link between censoring in any 
of the two decision variables and sales. Furthermore, advertising expenditure seems to be higher for 
innovating firms (i.e., those with positive R&D intensity), but average advertising expenditure is not 
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significantly different for diversifying and non-diversifying firms. Finally, the probability of positive 
R&D intensity is higher when diversification is greater, and viceversa. 
 
4. Results 
In order to illustrate the consequences of ignoring the potential econometric problems that we 
have mentioned in the previous section, we report alternative estimates based on different statistical 
assumptions. Specifically, we will first provide preliminary estimates whose consistency depends on the 
absence of firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity in Table 4, and our preferred estimates which take into 
account all the potential sources of endogeneity in Table 5. 
In Table 4 we present the preliminary estimation results, assuming that all the potential 
heterogeneity among firms is solely explained by its observed industry affiliation. Among these, we 
report estimates that consider different treatments of the censoring problem, ranging from the OLS and 
truncated OLS estimates (that ignore censoring) to the tobit and generalized selection models (that make 
different assumptions concerning how censoring is determined)
5
. We have dropped from the 
specifications further covariates which were clearly unimportant from a statistical point of view. Time 
and industry dummies were included in all estimations and found to be jointly significant. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Both in the R&D intensity and in the diversification equation, we find a large and significant 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. However, behind the magnitude of the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable, there may be a lack of control for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
6
 
The fact that the estimates of the tobit and generalized selection models appear substantially different 
suggest that the constraints behind the tobit specification are not satisfied. In particular, the factors 
determining the discrete decisions on whether to innovate or diversify are different from the factors that 
determine the continuous decisions concerning the magnitude of R&D intensity or diversification.
7
 This 
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result supports the generalized selection model, in which the sample selection term, given by the inverse 
of the Mills’ ratio, appears to be significant.  
It is worth noticing that the estimates from Table 4 are not robust in the presence of time-invariant 
unobserved firm heterogeneity correlated with the explanatory variables. In what follows, we will 
concentrate on results based on a dynamic panel data estimation which explicitly takes into account 
unobserved heterogeneity, together with the censoring problem of the dependent variables. Our reported 
estimates provide standard errors appropriately corrected from potential finite-sample bias as proposed by 
Windmeijer (2004). In both equations we introduced the explanatory variables lagged one period, except 
for the two lagged dependent variables, for which we initially introduced the first and second lag. The 
reported results only include the specification with those lags of the dependent variable that were found 
significant. 
Our final results for R&D intensity and related diversification are presented in Table 5.
8
 The first 
noticeable result is that, although the main qualitative findings remain, the magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients are remarkably different. In particular, the estimated coefficients corresponding to the lagged 
endogenous variable in both equations are now much smaller. This result highlights the existence of 
unobserved firm heterogeneity which produced upward biased coefficients for the lagged endogenous 
variable in the earlier non-robust estimates. The significance of the lagged dependent variables underlines 
the inertia behind the R&D intensity and diversification decisions, which we can attribute to the existence 
of significant learning effects. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
In the diversification equation, although the estimated coefficient of R&D intensity at t-2 is not 
significant at the five percent level, it is so at the ten percent level. We attribute the lower precision of the 
estimates in the diversification equation to the sharper incidence of censoring in the dependent variable. 
We can assert that the effect of R&D intensity on related diversification is positive, supporting hypothesis 
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1a. Nevertheless, this effect takes place with a two-period lag. This interesting result points out that the 
influence of R&D intensity takes longer, given that we found a very small and non-significant coefficient 
for the first lag of R&D intensity (not reported here for the sake of brevity). We also find that related 
diversification appears to have much inertia, as shown by the large coefficient associated with its lagged 
value. Whereas the AR(2) specification test does not provide evidence against the specification (the p-
value being clearly above ten percent), the Hansen-Sargan test is not so conclusive. 
In the R&D intensity equation, we confirm the positive (and significant) estimated effect of 
related diversification. Moreover, the fact that the coefficient of square related diversification has the 
opposite sign points out that, although related diversification stimulates R&D, such positive effect 
decreases as the level of related diversification rises. This result is coherent with hypothesis 1b, by which 
the influence of related diversification on R&D intensity comes through an inverted U-shaped function. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient on squared related diversification is significant at the 10 percent level. We 
attribute this lack of precision to the fact that this estimation procedure provides robust estimates at the 
expense of larger standard errors
9
.  
In any case, we achieve a much greater estimated short-run effect of related diversification than in 
the earlier estimates. Regarding unrelated diversification, we find no significant effect on R&D intensity. 
Finally, neither size, nor advertising expenditure, nor sales were significant at any reasonable significance 
level. Concerning the two specification tests that we have carried out, we do not find evidence against the 
specification, given that the p-value of both imply that we do not reject the corresponding null hypotheses 
at any usual significance level. 
From the estimated numerical values of the coefficients of related diversification and squared 
related diversification, we could compute the critical level after which additional increments in related 
diversification would imply a negative effect on R&D intensity. This critical level of related 
diversification is above 0.56, which is quite high, given that the average value of related diversification is 
lower than 0.06 in the full sample and about 0.47 for the subsample of observations with strictly positive 
values of related diversification. 
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From the estimates in Table 5, we can compute the long-run marginal effects taking into account 
the model dynamics, that we in Table 6. It can be seen that such long-run effects are much greater than 
the short-run effects.
10
 Specifically, an increase in related diversification of 0.01, will increase R&D 
intensity in the long run, on average, by 0.05 percent. On the other hand, if R&D intensity rises by 1 
percent, related diversification will increase in the long run, on average, by 0.005. Although this last 
magnitude is substantially large, it is nonetheless much smaller, and clearly more plausible, than the long-
run marginal effect implicit from the estimates reported in Table 5, which were inconsistent in the 
presence of firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity.11 In fact, notice that after one year only 60 percent of 
the effect of diversification on R&D intensity takes place, and less than 40% of the total effect of R&D 
intensity on diversification takes place after two years. In fact, it takes four years to produce 95 per cent 
of the effect of a change in diversification, and eight for 95 per cent of the effect of a change in R&D 
intensity. Therefore, we find support for the hypothesis 1, which states that the total effect between R&D 
intensity and diversification takes several years to be achieved.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper is mainly concerned with the potential dynamic and bidirectional relation between 
corporate diversification and R&D intensity. Empirical studies in strategic management literature have 
typically adopted a unidirectional approach, with mixed evidence. In our paper, we try to fill this gap by 
positing a bidirectional relationship between related diversification and R&D intensity in an organic 
growth context, and providing empirical evidence, based on a longitudinal sample of Spanish 
manufacturing firms between 1990 and 2001. 
Our findings emphasize the dynamic nature of the relationship between related diversification and 
R&D intensity, as shown by the significant coefficient of the corresponding lagged dependent variables. 
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This will imply remarkable differences between the long-run and the short-run effect of changes in these 
two strategic decisions of the firm, as postulated in our hypothesis. Our evidence supports the hypothesis 
that the effect of related diversification on R&D intensity takes on the shape of an inverted U, so that the 
effect of related diversification would be positive but at a marginally decreasing rate for moderate 
degrees, and eventually the sign of this effect could be reversed if the degree of related diversification is 
high enough. It is possible to attribute this shape to the generation and exploitation of economies of scope 
and synergies. On the other hand, we find a positive effect of R&D intensity on related diversification, but 
this (short-run) effect occurs with a delay of two years, implying that it takes some time for the effect to 
appear. This evidence supports some previous literature, which associates this effect to the existence of 
adjustment costs. 
The evidence concerning the bidirectional effects between corporate diversification and R&D 
intensity extends the earlier research in this area by revealing the need to consider the dynamics of 
diversification, and the causes and consequences of corporate diversification strategy in terms of 
resources. Unlike unrelated diversification, related diversification reinforces the benefits of synergies 
(leading to an increase in technological resources endowments) and economies of scope (favoring a more 
efficient use of such resources). Consequently, the value of the related diversified firms may increase as 
result of such synergies and economies of scope. This perspective may entail important research 
implications on the effects of diversification on performance. 
Our empirical findings in favor of the dynamic and bidirectional relationship have consequences 
about the distribution over time of the mutual effects between corporate diversification and R&D 
intensity, as well as the effect of further covariates. The interrelation between these two strategic variables 
follows a distributed lag structure, implying that the effect of a change in any variable takes some time. In 
other words, the change in the strategic variable after a change in any covariate is implemented gradually. 
Additionally, the effect of a change in any of the right-hand-side variables differs in the short and in the 
long run due to the presence of lagged values of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of each 
 21 
equation. In particular, we have found that the short-run effects are substantially lower than the long run-
effects.  
Given the magnitude of the estimates, we have also found that the time needed for the total effect 
on diversification of a change in R&D intensity to be completed is substantially greater than the time 
needed for the overall opposite effect to occur. Specifically, the effects do not occur instantaneously, and 
it takes several time periods for the overall effects to be completed. The ideas behind these findings 
should be acknowledged if the effects on performance are analyzed. 
The main results also confirm the importance of ensuring a proper treatment of the potential 
sources of endogeneity in the empirical analysis, since failure of accounting for endogeneity will lead to 
inconsistent estimates, and therefore the conclusions could be misleading. The most obvious source of 
endogeneity is the endogenous character of the relationship between related diversification and R&D 
intensity, which could be circumvented by means of instrumental variable procedures. The two other 
sources, even though less obvious and less dealt with in empirical work, are the censored nature of the 
two decision variables, and the existence of firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved 
heterogeneity should always be taken into account in empirical applications with firm-level data, given 
the fact that, no matter how many covariates we can control, relevant unobserved characteristics of such 
firms potentially correlated with the existing covariates will always remain. To the extent of our 
knowledge, this problem have usually been disregarded in this literature, with some exceptions, although 
we understand that in many cases this could be due to the lack of longitudinal data. We understand that 
the proper econometric treatment of these problems may entail a relative loss of precision in the 
estimates. Nevertheless, this loss of precision should not lead to disregard these problems, because the 
alternative estimates would be inconsistent, and therefore meaningless, no matter how precise they might 
be. 
 Our empirical study is confined to a sample of Spanish firms that only undergo organic growth. 
With regard to the country specificity of the sample, Mayer and Whittington (2003) suggest that the 
relationship between diversification and performance is influenced by the economic environment of the 
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country in which the company operates
12
. We should affirm that this idea can be extended to the context 
of our study. Nevertheless, Mayer and Whittington (2003) suggest that, although the theory of 
diversification strategies has been motivated largely from the experience of US companies, it can be 
generalized to Western European environments. Thus, we are prone to believe that our empirical results 
could be widely applicable within the scope of organic growth. 
 A sample composed of companies undergoing exclusively organic growth has allowed us to 
isolate the effect of the growth mode on the diversification strategy, but this also implies a limitation. On 
the one hand, it is very likely that strategies of external growth or cooperation play a differential role in 
the relationship under study, possibly opening up an important line of future research. On the other hand, 
restructuring processes, which have also been disregarded given the nature of our sample, may also 
modify the conclusions concerning such a relationship. Furthermore, the conclusion by Miller (2004) 
stating that the companies that diversify are less innovative is not applicable to our sample, since this 
conclusion is based on a sample of companies carrying out external growth. On the contrary, it is possible 
to argue that firms that follow a pattern of related diversification are more efficient in the use of the R&D 
investments (to the extent that they generate economies of scope) up to a certain degree of related 
diversification. Organic growth leads to more related diversification than external growth (Miller, 2004). 
 The evidence as to the functional form of the relationship has been provided with R&D intensity 
as an innovation measure, but it may differ for other measures of technological resources. Consequently, 
it is worth enquiring into how the relationship would be affected when alternative measures of 
technological resources, either internal or external measures, either input or output measures, are used. 
This suggests another subject of future investigation: attempting to test our hypothesis with alternative 
measures of technological resources. 
In summary, the results provide important evidence as to the bidirectional relationship between 
corporate diversification and R&D intensity in an organic growth context. Our study highlights the 
importance of accounting for dynamics in the analysis of corporate diversification. Given the potential 
importance of the conceptual and empirical approach developed in this study, considering dynamics 
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effects in the relationship between resources and corporate diversification, is likely to be fruitful in future 
theoretical and empirical studies in the analysis of corporate diversification. We believe that our study 
provides a robust approach for the empirical analysis of strategic decisions in general, and of corporate 
diversification in particular. In this regard, the econometric approach that we propose here may be a 
helpful benchmark for future research aimed at evaluating other implications of the RVB, such as the 
relationship between diversification decisions, resources and corporate performance. 
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TABLE 1. The unidirectional relationship between R&D and corporate diversification. Empirical evidence 
Type of 
relationship 
Study 
Diversification 
type 
Sign Growth type Sample Comments 
Bettis (1981) Related + No distinction USA Related-constrained and Related-linked categories 
Bettis and Mahajan (1985) Related + No distinction USA Related-constrained and Related-linked categories 
R&D / 
Diversification 
Association Lecraw (1984) Related + No distinction Canada Related-constrained and Related-linked categories 
Chatterjee and Singh (1999) Related + Organic, External USA No influence of R&D on mode of growth 
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) Related + No distinction USA  
Delios and Beamish (1999) Related + No distinction Japan  
Hill and Hansen (1991) 
Related 
Unrelated 
- No distinction USA 
Pharmaceutical industry. Diversification and 
R&D compete on the funds  
Miller (2004) 
Related  
Unrelated 
- 
External, 
n.s. for organic  
USA 
Positive relation between related diversification 
and organic growth 
Miller (2006) Related + No distinction USA 
Negative effect after controlling for firms having 
no R&D or in R&D intensive industries  
Montgomery and Hariharan (1991) Related + No distinction USA  
Schoenecker and Cooper (1998) Unrelated - No distinction USA Computer and PC industries 
R&D  
Diversification 
Silverman (1999) Related + No distinction USA Detailed level of technological resources analysis  
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) 
Related 
Unrelated 
n.s. 
- 
No distinction USA 
Pharmaceutical industry. Modified version of the 
concentric index to estimate synergy  
Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk (1991) 
Related 
Unrelated 
n.s. 
n.s. 
No distinction USA  
Davis and  Thomas (1993) Related + No distinction USA  
Hill and  Snell (1989) Unrelated n.s. No distinction USA R&D per employee 
Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland and  Harrison (1991) Unrelated - External USA  
Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson and  Moesel (1996) No distinction - External USA Diversification as control variable 
Hitt, Hoskisson and  Kim (1997) No distinction - No distinction USA  
Hoskisson and  Hitt (1988) 
Related 
Unrelated 
n.s. 
n.s. 
No distinction  
Dominant business firms have a higher relative 
R&D  
Hoskisson and  Johnson (1992) 
Related 
Unrelated 
+ 
- 
External USA 
Restructuring  effect on diversification strategy 
and R&D  
Diversification  
R&D 
Stimpert and  Duhaime (1997) Related (4) - No distinction USA  
TABLE 2. Correlation matrix 
 
 R&D Unrelated 
div. 
Related 
div. 
Firm size Firm age 
(years) 
Advertising 
exp. 
Unrelated div. 0.1311
***
      
Related div. 0.0616
**
 -0.0086     
Firm size 0.2969
***
 0.0241 -0.0266    
Firm age (years) -0.0025 0.0124 0.0892
***
 0.1331
*
   
Advertising exp. 0.0085 -0.0756
**
 -0.0219 -0.0532 0.2426
***
  
ln(Sales) 0.0803
*** 
-0.0033 0.0225 0.5877
***
 0.2251
***
 0.2158
***
 
* 
denotes significance at the 10 percent level; 
** 
denotes significance at the 5 percent level; 
***
 
denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
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TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics: means and standard deviations of the relevant variables 
 R&D Unrelated 
div. 
Related 
div. 
Firm  
size 
Firm age 
(years) 
Advertising 
exp. 
ln(Sales) 
       
Full sample        
 0.0130 0.0518 0.0569 572.3 32.96 2.28 15.13 
 0.0263 0.1601 0.1711 1234.6 26.70 3.98 1.35 
        
Related diversification = 0       
R&D = 0 0 0.0358 0 255.6 29.11 1.70 14.41 
  0.1382  625.9 25.00 3.07 1.24 
R&D > 0 0.0190 0.0554 0 652.2 33.46 2.66 15.46 
 0.0301 0.1652  1254.4 27.77 4.52 1.27 
All 0.0124 0.0486 0 537.1 31.94 2.33 15.09 
 0.0260 0.1565  1122.1 26.90 4.09 1.36 
        
Related diversification > 0       
R&D = 0 0 0.0613 0.3883 344.4 37.12 1.14 15.30 
  0.1708 0.2531 362.6 22.89 1.43 1.22 
R&D > 0 0.0231 0.0793 0.4939 1024.5 41.31 2.26 15.42 
 0.0308 0.1874 0.2038 2197.9 24.41 3.31 1.29 
All 0.0173 0.0748 0.4675 834.1 40.26 1.98 15.39 
 0.0285 0.1829 0.2210 1884.6 24.02 2.99 1.27 
Standard deviations in italics       
TABLE 4.Preliminary estimates 
 R&D equation  Diversification equation 
Variable OLS Truncated 
OLS 
Tobit Generalized 
selection 
 OLS Truncated 
OLS 
Tobit Generalized 
selection 
R&D (t-1) 0.5814
*** 
0.5593
*** 
0.6632
*** 
0.5669
*** 
 0.1504
** 
0.3666 1.3016
*** 
0.5756
** 
 (0.0890) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0178)  (0.0590) (0.2980) (0.0000) (0.2704) 
Unrelated diversification (t-1) 0.0098 0.0024 0.0251
** 
0.0040  0.0073 -0.0118 0.0989
*** 
0.0201 
 (0.0089) (0.0138) (0.0122) (0.0132)  (0.0091) (0.0548) (0.0000) (0.0493) 
Squared Unrelated diversification (t-1) -0.0175 -0.0047 -0.0380
* 
-0.0071      
 (0.0145 (0.0227 (0.0198 (0.0218      
Related diversification (t-1) 0.0119
** 
0.0184
** 
0.0158
* 
0.0187
** 
 0.8658
*** 
0.5488
*** 
1.7956
*** 
0.8764
*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0096) (0.0083) (0.0092)  (0.0082) (0.0395) (0.0000) (0.0573) 
Squared Related diversification (t-1) -0.0104 -0.0182 -0.0120 -0.0185      
 (0.0082) (0.0141) (0.0118) (0.0135)      
Size 0.0031
*** 
0.0043
*** 
0.0049
*** 
0.0045
*** 
 -0.0006 -0.0065 0.0104 -0.0052 
 (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012)  (0.0032) (0.0251) (0.0000) (0.0225) 
Young firm(Y/n) 0.0011 0.0027 0.0008 0.0025  0.0023 -0.0419 -0.0315
*** 
-0.0273 
 (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0017)  (0.0047) (0.0366) (0.0000) (0.0327) 
Advertising exp. (t-1) 0.0002
*** 
0.0002 0.0004
*** 
0.0002
** 
 -0.0002 0.0022 -0.0015 0.0007 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0004) (0.0031) (0.0000) (0.0028) 
ln(Sales) (t-1) -0.0018
*** 
-0.0040
*** 
-0.0002 -0.0037
*** 
 0.0014 0.0045 0.0228
*** 
0.0135 
  (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009)  (0.0026) (0.0211) (0.0000) (0.0188) 
Lambda    0.0032
** 
    0.1498
*** 
    (0.0014)     (0.0173) 
Number of observations 3508 2248 3508 3508  3508 375 3508 3508 
R-squared 0.51 0.51    0.79 0.75   
Chi2    2552.45     1084.49 
Log-likelihood 8972.07 5375.46 4478.18   3933.38 280.28 -343.13  
Joint significance test (p-value) 0.025 0.027 0.007 0.069      
          
The estimation method is indicated in the lower upper part of each column. 
None of the estimates reported in this Table are consistent in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. 
The lag (t-1) is indicated to the left of each variable. Standard errors in italics below each estimated coefficient. The variable lambda denotes the selectivity correction 
term in the generalized selection model. Time dummies, industry dummies and interactions between them included in all equations. 
Chi2 (whenever applicable) is a test of joint significance of all the covariates (excluding the constant).  
The joint significance test evaluates the hypothesis that the coefficients of related diversification and squared related diversification are jointly equal to zero. 
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
TABLE 5. Dynamic panel data estimation 
Variable Equation 
 R&D  Diversification 
    
R&D (t-1) 0.3955
*** 
  
 (0.1208)   
R&D (t-2)   0.1783
** 
   (0.1006) 
Unrelated diversification (t-1) -0.0082  0.0419 
 (0.0247)  (0.0616) 
Squared Unrelated diversification (t-1) 0.0250   
 (0.0559)   
Related diversification (t-1) 0.0355
** 
 0.6417
*** 
 (0.0177)  (0.0912) 
Squared Related diversification (t-1) -0.0316
*   
 (0.0198)   
Size 0.0000  -0.0357 
 (0.0051)  (0.0221) 
Advertising exp. (t-1) -0.0003  -0.0023 
 (0.0005)  (0.0022) 
ln(Sales) (t-1) 0.0031  0.0082
 
  (0.0045)  (0.0059) 
    
Hansen-Sargan test 233.03  106.97 
(p-value) 0.20  0.03 
AR(2) test 0.15  -1.50 
(p-value) 0.88  0.13 
The lag (t-1 or t-2) is indicated to the left of each variable. 
Standard errors in italics below each estimated coefficient. 
Time dummies were included in all estimations. 
Both the Hansen test and the AR(2) test are specification tests that help to evaluate the 
validity of the estimates. The p-values indicate the significance level below which the 
null hypothesis is rejected. 
The Hansen-Sargan test evaluates the null hypothesis of validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions, and it is asymptotically distributed (under the null) as a chi-square with as 
many degrees of freedom as the number of over-identifying restrictions. In our context, 
this test of over-identifying restriction can be viewed as a test for instrument validity. If 
the instruments used in GMM estimation are valid, then the Hansen-Sargan test ought 
to be statistically equal to zero. 
The AR(2) test is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null 
hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation in the error term of the first-differences 
transformed model. This test is based on the fact that if the model is properly specified, 
the transformed error term cannot show second order autocorrelation. 
* 
denotes significance at the 10 percent level; 
** 
denotes significance at the 5 percent 
level; 
***
 denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
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TABLE 6. Long run vs. short run effects 
 Related Diversification → R&D R&D → Related Diversification 
   
Long run effect
 
0.053 0.498 
Short run effect 0.032 0.178 
   
Percentage of the short run effect 
with respect to the overall (long 
run) effect 
 
60.4 40.4 
Number of approximate periods 
after 95% of the overall effect has 
taken place
* 
4 8 
   
Calculations based on dynamic panel data estimates from Table 5. 
*
This calculation is done taking into account that the accumulated effect after s periods is given by 
(1 ) /1sβ ρ ρ− − , whereas the total long run effect is /(1 )β ρ− . Therefore, the number of time periods after 
which 95% of the effect has taken place is ln(1 0.95) / lns ρ= − , which has been rounded to the nearest 
integer. Notice that it should also be taken into account that the variable for which the effect is being 
considered is lagged one period. 
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APPENDIX. DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY INDUSTRY AND BY SIZE 
 
Table A1. Distribution of companies by industry and by size 
Size 
Industry (2-digit SIC code) 
Small Medium Large All 
Iron, steel and metal (22) 4 1 19 24 
Building materials (24) 7 10 17 34 
Chemicals (25) 14 13 33 60 
Non-ferrous metals (31) 14 17 17 48 
Machinery (32 + 33) 12 14 18 44 
Electric materials (34) 12 6 20 38 
Electronic (35) 4 5 11 20 
Motor vehicles (36) 2 7 26 35 
Ship building (37) 1 1 2 4 
Other motor vehicles (38) 0 0 7 7 
Precision instruments (39) 0 2 3 5 
Non-elaborated food (41) 5 6 17 28 
Food, tobacco & drinks (42) 3 2 15 20 
Basic Textile (43) 5 10 16 31 
Leather (44) 2 1 0 3 
Garment (45) 15 7 8 30 
Wood and furniture (46) 5 3 5 13 
Cellulose and paper edition (47) 4 10 17 31 
Plastic materials (48) 8 12 8 28 
Other non-basic (49) 4 2 4 10 
All 121 129 263 513 
Source: Sample selected by the authors from Encuesta Sobre Estrategias 
Empresariales (ESEE). 
Firms are broken down by Size, in accordance with their average employment, as 
Small (up to 100 employees), Medium (between 100 and 250 employees) and Large 
(more than 250 employees). 
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1
 Growth modes affect the extent of diversification (Busija, O’Neill and Zeitthaml 1997, Chang and Singh 1999, 
Chatterjee and Singh 1997), and are associated with R&D intensity (Miller 2004). 
2
 Those firms which diversify through organic growth use a highly specific set of resources, as for example, 
technological resources. On the other hand, organic growth usually encourages related diversification. Those firms 
with inferior technological resources will be prone to unrelated diversification towards external growth (Miller 
2004). 
3
 The ESEE is produced by Fundación Empresa Pública, a public institute financed by the Spanish Ministry of 
Industry. The original data set was designed with the aim of ensuring the representativeness of Spanish 
manufacturing firms. For this purpose, all the companies with more than 200 employees were surveyed (and, 
accordingly with the information provided by those responsible for the data set, about 70% completed the survey), 
and smaller companies with more than 10 employees were selected on the basis of a stratified sampling. 
4 The rationale for these last two restrictions is that, in general, the potential role of diversification (and probably 
innovation) is quite scarce in the case of companies focused on local markets and/or without a sufficient size. 
5
 Notice that OLS estimates with the full sample will be inconsistent because of the fact that a significant fraction of 
the observations for the dependent variables is censored at zero. By the same token, OLS estimates with the 
truncated sample of strictly positive observations (that is, uncensored observations) will also be inconsistent, since 
the sample selection bias, after excluding censored observations, is not taken into account. 
6
 It is well known that when ignoring unobserved heterogeneity, the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is typically oversized in absolute value. 
7
 Regarding the diversification equation, the likelihood of the tobit model did not converge, so that their associated 
estimates are completely unreliable. Behind this fact, there exists evidence that the constraints that the tobit model 
imposes do not hold. 
8
 Any variable which kept constant over time after applying the fixed effects transformation was not considered, 
since the fixed-effects transformation would drop it. In particular, age effects could not be taken into account. 
9
 Such a loss of precision is due to two reasons: the transformation needed to remove the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity component as well as the use of predictions of the latent dependent variable instead of its 
(unobserved) true value in order to take into account censoring in the dependent variable. 
10
 Letting β  be the short-run effect, and ρ the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, the long-run effect is 
calculated as /(1 )β ρ− . 
11
 In particular, since the coefficient of lagged R&D in the generalized selection estimates was around 0.58 (which 
appeared to be unbelievably large), the implied long-run effect was about 5. 
12
 The home country environment is characterized by features and institutions (Wan and Hoskisson 2003) that 
determine both the allocations of technological resources and the diversification strategies of the companies. 
